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PREFACE 
I would like to acknowledge the patience and kindness of the 
many librarians who have aided me the course of the compiling 
of this work, in particular the members of the staffs of the 
Virginia Historical Society, the Library of Virginia, the U nivedity 
of Richmond, the College of William and Mary, and the Universi-
ty of Virginia and especially E. Lee Shepard and Margaret Cook. 
The editorial assistance of Sara B. Bearss was generously given 
and gratefully received. I hope that this bibliography may in 
return be of service to all of them. The Virginia section of 
Pimsleur's Checklists is printed here with the kind permission of 
the American Association of Law Libraries. The illustrative title 
pages are reproduced with the permission of the Library of 
Virginia. 
Richmond, Virginia 
January 1, 1997 
W. H. Bryson 
INTRODUCTION 
Seventy-five years ago, legal history was well understood to 
be the study of the origins and development of the current law, 
both substantive and procedu~al. (The prac~cing lawyer needs b~th 
goals and methods.) Legal history dealt w1th the law of property, 
contracts, persons, 1 torts, crimes, and actions so far as the last can 
be considered separately from the first five and their numerous 
subdivisions. 
Recently, this field of study has been belittled as "lawyers' 
legal history," "legal formalism," and "old" legal history. It is 
necessary to consider these charges in order to explain the scope 
of this bibliography. 
I 
Morton J. Horwitz coined the expression "lawyer's legal 
history" in an article entitled "The Conservative Tradition in the 
Writing of American Legal History. "2 This article is an ideologi-
cal attack on the political opinions of Roscoe Pound and James 
McClellan as expressed in their publications on legal history. 
Horwitz defines lawyer's legal history as "the study of legal 
doctrine . . . devoted to finding the origin of doctrines. "3 Where 
this study deviates from Horwitz's political beliefs, it is said to be 
a "special blindness. "4 Horwitz believes that "[t]he main thrust of . 
lawyer's legal history, then, is to pervert the real function of 
history by reducing it to the pathetic role of justifying the world 
as it is." 
1 Including constitutional law. 
z Morton J. Horwitz, "The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of 
American Legal History," AJLH 11 (1973): 275-94. 
3 Ibid., p. 276. 
4 Ibid., p. 277. 
s Ibid., p. 281. 
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Although William E. Nelson has accepted the term "law-
yers' legal history, "6 he disagrees with Horwitz's denigration of 
Pound, James B. Ames, Christopher C. Langdell, and the others. 7 
Nelson uses the term "to apply only to work addressing current 
legal auestions and not to work examining the origin of modem 
rules. ,:s 
Although it is obvious that lawyers and academics can 
distort and fabricate legal history to support the positions of their 
clients or their personal political philosophies, it is not a foregone, 
preordained necessity. The mere addressing of current legal 
questions from a historical perspective does not force one to any 
particular political conclusion, as Nelson has pointed out. The 
discovery of the origin of a legal doctrine or the understanding of 
its development might as easily lead to the support of a poor 
person as a rich one, a Democrat as a Republican, a liberal as a 
conservative. 
As an example, the historical explanation of Virginia 
constitutional law in A. E. Dick Howard's "For the Common 
Benefit: Constitutional History in Virginia as a Casebook for the 
Modem Constitution Maker" in 1968 helped prepare the drafting 
and promulgation of the new constitution of Virginia in 1971.9 
An anonymous article in 1858 strongly advocated that the 
law be changed to make interested parties competent as wit-
nesses. 
10 This groposal bore fruit eight years later in the form of 
a new statute. 
Walter Wadlington considered the historical origins and 
development of the prohibition of interracial marriages in Virginia 
6 William E. Nelson and John Phillip Reid, The Literature of American 
Legal History (New York, 1985), p. 235. 
7 Ibid., pp. 185-200. 
'.1. .. 
8 Ibid., p. 235, n. 1. 
9 A. E. Dick Howard, "For the Common Benefit: Constitutional History 
in Virginia as a Casebook for the Modem Constitution Maker," Va. Law 
Review 54 (1968): 816-902. 
10 
"The Competency of Witnesses," Quart. Law Journal, 3 (1858): 289-96. 
11 Va. Acts 1865-1866, chap. 21, p. 87; present Va. Code Ann. § 
8.01-396. 
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and concluded that, if there ever were valid reasons in the past for 
the statutes forbidding such relationships they were no longer 
justified.12 He advocated that the courts d~lare the statutes to be 
unconstitutional, and they did. 13 
The PrudeD:t Man Statute was enacted in Virginia14 following 
the recommendation of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. in an article giving 
significant historical background. 15 ' _ "' 
. A brief written for parti~~ purposes can include much legal 
history and be scholarly within the bounds of its legitimate 
p~sanship. An academic researcher alert to the purposes of such 
wnting can put such work to good non partisan· use. Two 
examples are Thomas Jefferson's "Whether Christianity is a Part 
of the Common Law" 16 and David Flaherty's "Vir~inia and the 
Marginal Sea: An Example of History in the Law.'' 7 
~.e study of the ?rigin and development of the law is, in 
my op~o~, a wof!:hw~e endeavor. It gives the reason for the 
law, a stgmficant dtmens10n. Whether the reason is good or bad 
eternally valid or no longer viable, will be a matter of opinion~ 
perhaps a cause for retention, perhaps the impetus for change. 18 ' 
. The reason professional lawyers should be encouraged to 
wnte legal history is that they are trained in the technicalities of 
the la'Y that lay hi~tori~s lack;. ~oreover, the daily experiences 
of therr law practice giVe an ms1ght that academics lack. The 
12 \Yalt~r W~dlington, "!he Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation 
Statute m Histoncal Perspective," Va. Law Review 52 (1966): 1189-1223. 
13 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
14 Va. Acts 1956, chap. 660, p. 1010; present Va. Code Ann. § 26-45.1. 
15 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., "The Virgini~ Prudent Man Rule of Trust Invest-
ments," Va. Law Review 34 (1948): 102-28. 
16 Appendix to Thomas Jefferson, Reports of Cases Detennined in the 
General Court of Virginia (Charlottesville, 1829), pp. 137-42; this was the 
substance of Jefferson's argument in Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. 96 (1771). 
• 
17 ~avid H. Fl~erty, "Virginia and the Marginal Sea: An Example of 
History m the Law, Va. Law Review 58 (1927): 694-725; this was part of the 
evidence presented in United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). 
18 Change is not necessarily improvement; if change is to be made progress 
should outweigh dislocation. ' 
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social historians and the political historians often appear to be 
blissfully ignorant of the practical, actual significance of minute 
technical legal distinctions upon which a lawsuit may stand or fall. 
The academic lawyer too often lacks an understanding of the 
subtle relationships of a lawyer and a judge, of a lawyer and his 
or her client on an individual level, the general relationships 
between the bar and the bench, and the legal profession and the 
general public. These are eternal problems whose solutions yet 
elude. 
n 
This ~proach to legal history has also been described as 
formalistic. 1 As Frederick Schauer has pointed out, legal formal-
ism is a loosely used term of denigration, a straw man created by 
the legal realists and their followers. 20 Ernest J. Weinrib has 
recently looked behind the sneer of formalism to fmd a generally 
accepted definition: "[f]ormalism postulates that law is intelligible 
as an internally coherent phenomenon. "21 Schauer goes on to argue 
that legal formalism is not necessarily "inexorable"22 and is not all 
bad and that "presumptive formalism" might even have some 
virtues. 23 Weinrib states that "formalism, properly understood, is 
indispensable to our understanding of law. "24 Formalism is "[t]he 
logical interdependence of the parts [of the law] to each other and 
19 See Nelson and Reid, Literature of American Legal History, pp. 1-7; 
Nelson does not, however, expressly belittle formalistic legal history. 
2° Frederick Schauer, "Formalism," Yale Law Journal97 (1988): 510. 
21 Ernest J. Weinrib, "Legal Formalism," Yale Law Journal 97 (1988): 
95t; 
22 If the law is not socially useful or not philosophically just, the law can 
be changed. The holder of sovereign legislative power can change the law at 
will. Sir Rupert Cross in his book Precedent in English Law (3d ed.; Oxford, 
1979) has shown how judges bound in theory by the law can and do avoid 
injustice. 
23 Schauer, "Formalism." 
24 Weinrib, "Legal Formalism," p. 957. 
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to the whole. "25 Formalism is elegantia juris;26 formalism is the 
general stating of the law; formalism is the law.27 
The other side of the coin is that the law should be socially 
useful and philosophically just. Therefore, the law should be 
applied to achieve these ends. And indeed it is. However, if the 
judges totally ignore the settled law as established by legal 
precedent, then they are ruling according to their own persoiJal 
feelings of utility and justice. If this is carried too far, then ·the 
predictability and generality of the law is lost. The concepts of 
legal realism when carried too far lead to particularity and then to 
anarchy. Anarchy is not law. . 
Legal formalism is the statement and classification of legal 
principles. The stating and arranging of the law is necessary to its 
understanding and utility.28 If the law is not arranged, it is not 
understood or certainly not as quickly understandable, nor is it 
serviceable. Arrangement leads to system and to order and to 
internal consistency. Thus utilitas is dependent upon and served by 
elegantia. Social utility is aided by legal formalism. 
The study of the history of Roman law and English common 
law suggests that the law grew from individual determinations. 
The law started as a particularistic application of a sense of justice 
in a dispute between two individuals. The result was a precedent. 
When enough acceptable precedents had accumulated, then 
generalization~ could be and were made. The gen.eralization .of ~he 
law is formalism. The development of the law 1s the continumg 
accumulation of individual precedents based on or guided by 
earlier cases, and it is the broadening of the general statements of 
the law. The more we have of the former, the better will be the 
latter, and vice versa. 
25 Peter Stein's description of the Napoleonic Code: Peter Stein, "Elegance 
in Law," Law Quarterly Review 77 (1961): 242, 254. 
26 Logische geschlossenheit, logical completeness. 
Z7 This is not to say that a particular statement of the law is always correct. 
Jurists can and do err; the concept of stare decisis can be carried too far. Nor 
is it to say that the general law that is generally good always produces justice 
in a particular case; what to do when it does not is a separate issue. 
28 A bad law is not made good by being fit into a logical classification. 
Perhaps it will stand out more clearly as bad leading to its removal from the 
body of law by one time-honored method or another. 
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The general definition of the law is the task of the scholars; 
its specific application is the duty of the practitioners, both judges 
and advocates. The scholars naturally emphasize elegantia and the 
practitioners utilitas. However, uti lit as demands a consistency in 
the law; predictability is usefuL And on the other hand, a legal 
theory that is beautifully logical but inapplicable or irrelevant to 
society is vain and silly. 
Young scholars build on the work of their elders. Ideas are 
passed on by written and by oral means, and there is a continuum 
of legal scholarship from the Twelve Tables of ancient Rome to 
the present. 29 Our understanding of the law has grown through the 
need to accommodate both theory and practice and to reconcile 
each to the other. 
One of the dimensions of legal scholarship is legal history. 
In order to know what the law is, it is helpful to know what it 
was. The present is the product of the past. The mere knowledge 
of the change is instructive, and the understanding of the reason 
for the change is enlightening. If we know the failures of the past, 
we can avoid repeating them in the future. The successes of the 
past can be emulated and preserved. Thus, the study of the legal 
doctrines and practices of the past is to be encouraged. 
As for jurisprudence, whatever one's philosophical approach 
to the law may be, it must be confirmed and validated by 
experience, and experience is history, whether ancient or recent. 
Law is a social phenomenon, not a mathematical abstraction. 
The formal statement of the law is necessary for its analysis; 
this is one of the purposes of legal history. The question, next, is 
what are the sources of the law. 
A. Generally 
'tl·~ 
The Sources of the Law 
The law in order to exist must be perceived. It cannot be 
followed or used if it is not known. In general, then, the law is 
what it is stated to be. The law is the formal statement of the law, 
29 It is to be remembered that Bracton was a knowledgeable Romanist, and 
even countries such as Japan that had no European colonial connections have 
studied and accepted parts of European law, such as commercial law and 
international law. 
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for good or for evil. The law is not necessarily good and where 
it is seen to be deficient, it can be changed. Furtherm~re the law 
can be misstated, and where it is seen to have been so, it can be 
s~t~ better .or !t:stated ?l~re clearly. Legal academic writers may 
cnticlZe a JUdicial opmmn, and the judiciary may alter the 
common ~av: or restate it more clearly or restate it more complete-
ly. The similar process can occur when a judge criticizes a-!llle 
of law an? suggests legislative changes. It is the primary function 
of the legislature (or of whoever exercises the legislative function) 
to state and to change the law. 
B. Specifically 
1. Legislative Sources of the Law 
The supreme source of the law is a formal constitution that 
is intended to be the statement of the fundamental and ultimate 
law in force. Constitutions are usually the work of broad based 
conventions ~d are usually formally ratified by the people to be 
governed by 1t. Although such ratification is not necessary it is 
considered helpful in obtaining broad and voluntary support' for it 
as law. 
Constitutions can be ignored, amended, or replaced with 
n~w (and, one hopes, better) ones. Constitutional ideas and prin-
ciples are not always good nor above criticism· on the other hand 
successful clause~ have been copied from old by new constitution~ 
and from one nation by others. Not only are constitutions printed 
but ~eq_uently the ~ebates and subsidiary documents of th~ 
constitutional conventions are published as well. 
National and provincial legislatures enact statutes and local 
governing boards and councils enact ordinances within their 
political boundaries. Administrative agencies cr~te law in the 
f?rm of regulations. This legislative activity generates a substantial 
literature. At the end of each session of the legislature there app~s. the Acts of .Ass~mbly, 30 which are the chron~logical 
publication of the legislative enactments. Statute law in force is 
frequently compiled by subject into codes. The code can be 
abridged in various ways for the convenience of particular classes 
of user; a good example of this is the federal Internal Revenue 
30 In some jurisdictions, they are called Statutes at Large. 
I! 
I 
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Code. The various administrative agencies issue printed editions 
of their rules and regulations. 
These legislative forms of law - constitutions, statutes, 
ordinances, and regulations - are statements of the law. They are 
subject to change by repeal by the legislative body that created it 
or by a superior one. The state legislature, for example, can 
declare a local ordinance to be void. Furthermore, a court can 
declare a statute to be void as violative of a superior constitutional 
law. (It would not be reasonable or logical for a legislature to 
make the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of its own 
statute. must be presumed that its own statute was considered 
to be constitutional when it was enacted, or else it would not have 
been done.) 
2. Judicial Sources of the Law 
The primary function of legislative bodies is to declare the 
general law. The primary function of the law courts is to apply 
the general law to specific, individual situations.31 The courts, in 
the process of adjudication, state general principles of law and 
state the specific application of the law. Therefore, whether a 
judge is creative or not, adjudication states the law and is thus a 
source, whether original or not, of the law. 
As with legislative bodies, there is a hierarchy of courts. 
Naturally, the statements of the higher courts will be accorded 
greater deference as to the validity of their statements of the law. 
However, all courts, appellate, trial, and administrative, are 
actively involved in the process of stating and restating the law, 
declaring what the unwritten common law is and what an act of 
legislation means. 
The opinions of the judges are printed in books called 
reports of cases. The courts also publish their general rules of 
court, which dictate the procedure to be followed in the litigation 
of a particular matter. In addition to these professional books, 
accounts of notable trials have been published for popular 
consumption. 
31 Of course, the legislature can enact a private bill, and the court can 
declare a general law to be invalid. 
lnt 
3. Legal Scholarship 
Even though the wor 
community has no official, 
opinions of legal scholars (a: 
ments of the law. The differe 
a plowman is only one of ed1 
The statement of the la 
consideration that it deserves 
law are, in fact, accorded gn: 
to be authoritative. 
Academic or seconda.I) 
chy. Jurisprudence, the philo~ 
ultimate and fundamental la' 
principles of the substantive 1: 
ing the enforceability of con1 
torts, and so on. They expm 
courts, without which the su 
effect. Finally, there are leg~ 
primary statements of the laVI 
the judgments of the courts. 
the statement and restatemen1 
fact, the practitioners of the 1: 
scholarship in inverse order 
law. 
The legal academics : 
statement and of the restatem 
law help bring it into focus. 1 
and the unwritten law as dec] 
the law. If the law is not 
administration of the law det 
the individual judge. The sta 
legal literature makes it poss 
known, it can be discussed 2 
criticism can lead to the chan 
4. Legal Argument 
The primary function 1 
lawyers, is the statement of t! 
of their clients. This class of 
of the scale because the law) 
position so long as it is a 
gal History before 1900 
gencies issue printed editions 
LW - constitutions, statutes, 
atements of the law. They are 
egislative body that created it 
egislature, for example, can 
ld. Furthermore, a court can 
ve of a superior constitutional 
lr logical for a legislature to 
:he constitutionality of its own 
s own statute was considered 
~ted, or else it would not have 
lative bodies is to declare the 
of the law courts is to apply 
1al situations.31 The courts, in 
~eneral principles of law and 
e law. Therefore, whether a 
1n states the law and is thus a 
the law. 
1ere is a hierarchy of courts. 
gher courts will be accorded 
of their statements of the law. 
rial, and administrative, are 
stating and restating the law, 
Lon law is and what an act of 
are printed in books called 
publish their general rules of 
:o be followed in the litigation 
to these professional books, 
been published for popular 
~t a private bill, and the court can 
Introduction 17 
3. Legal Scholarship 
Ev~n though the 'York pro~uct of the legal academic 
co~~umty has no official, bmdmg, or legal authority, the 
op1mons of legal scholars (and of the general public) are state-
ments of th~ law. The difference.between a professor of law and 
a plowman 1s only one of education and experience. .~· ,r; 
. The. stateme~t of the law by an academic will be given the 
constder~tion that 1t deserves. Some academic statements of the 
law are, m ~act: accorded great weight, and some are considered 
to be authontative. · 
A~ademic or second~ legal authority has its own hierar-
ch¥· Junsprudence, the philosophy of law, is the statement of the 
ultimate and fundamental law. Legal writers also set forth the 
:principles of the s?~stantive law - for example, the rules govern-
mg the enforceability of contracts, the definitions of crimes and 
torts, and. so on. 1ftey expound upon the procedural law of the 
courts, V?Ithout which the substantive law could not be put into 
effect. Fmally, there are legal scholars who edit and publish the 
pnll'!-ary statements of the law, the statutes of the legislatures and 
the JUdgments of the courts. These humble editors make feasible 
the statement ~d restatement of the law by all of the others. In 
fact, the .:pra?ti~oners of the law value the various classes of legal 
scholarship m mverse order from the academic scholars of the 
law. 
The legal academics are an important part of both the 
statement and of the restatement of the law. Their treatises on the 
law help bring it into focus. The explanations of the statutory law 
and the unwritten law as declared by the courts are statements of 
the ~a:v. If the law is not stated and agreed upon, then the 
adm!ffi~tr.ation .of the law deteriorates into the personal whim of 
the md1v1dual Judge. The statement of the law in the secondary 
legal lit~rature makes it possible to know the law. If the law is 
~~w_n, 1t can be discussed and criticized. Academic and public 
cnticism can lead to the change or restatement of the law. 
4. Legal Argument 
Th~ primary function of the practitioners of the law, the 
lawye~s, 1~ the stat~ment of the law in arguments made on behalf 
of therr clients. This class of legal statement is at the lower end 
of tp~ scale because t~e Iawyer~s duty is to represent his client's 
position so long as 1t 1s a plausible one. The lawyer in the 
18 A Bibliography of Virginia Legal History before 1900 
courtroom is a partisan stating his client's legal positions, which 
are not necessarily his own. However, the legal dialogue in the 
courtroom between opposing counsel is very useful in guiding the 
impartial judge in his statement of the law as it applies to the 
parties in court. The practicalities of the current situation of the 
courts in America are that the lawyers usually have much more 
time to study the applicable law than does the judge. Thus, the 
research and scholarship of the lawyers, though partisan, is vital 
to the process of stating the law in the individual case. 
The written arguments presented to appellate courts in the 
lawyers' briefs are usually required to be printed. They are not 
widely available, but they are preserved in the archives of the 
courts and in some academic law libraries. They are frequently 
. interesting and useful. · 
5. Divine Revelation 
Divine revelation of the law is a possible source of the law. 
The giving of the Ten Commandments to Moses32 is an example. 
The authority of such law is unassailable. The problem with divine 
revelation is the credibility of the person claiming to be God's 
messenger; it, then, is a question of belief in God and in the 
prophet. Even Jesus warned of false prophets.33 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that in the historical 
statement and development of the law, it has been done over time 
in the reverse order from that just given. First came the law said 
by the priests to have been given by God, then the law was 
presented by the elders of the community, then it was stated by 
the judges as officials of the king or of the state, then enacted by 
the legislators as official representatives of the people, and finally 
promulgated by constitutional conventions acting as superlegisla-
tures. 
~.r A---
III 
This approach is presently called "old" legal history. "New" 
legal history is the study of the relationships between law and 
32 Exodus 20. 
33 Matthew 7:15. 
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society. "New" legal history focuses on the external influences 
on the law and vice versa rather than on the statement and 
understand~g of ~e law by itself and its intel!lal consistency. 34 
. T~e mteractions between law and society are indeed a 
fascmating study. However, it requires an understanding of the 
law as well as society. And by use of the word law here I mean 
the abstract legal doctrines of tort, contract, negotiabl~ instru-
ments, property, and so forth, what Joseph H. Smith --offen 
referred to as "nuts and bolts" law.35 One cannot write about law 
and society without understanding the law. Thus, the "old" lej;al 
history is a necessary precondition to the "new" legal history. 3 In 
fac~, most "old" legal history was and is written with an eye on 
soc1al developments rather than an emphasis on them. Regretfully ~uch "ne;-v" ~egal history _is ac~ally social, economic, or politicai 
history With little or no d1scuss1on of legal developments, that is, 
the history of the law. Those scholars who are interested in the 
study of law and society will encourage and support research into 
and the statement of the technicalities of legal doctrine at different 
periods in the past. 
This bibliography focuses on the "old" legal history not 
only as a matter of leading the user to fundamental research but 
also as a matter of bibliographical practicality. The "new" legal 
his~ory has ~o meaningful boundaries. The study of law and 
~oc1ety can mclude the study of almost everything; society 
mcludes every aspect of human conduct, and the law touches 
almost every aspect of society. In order to keep this bibliography 
focused upon the law, I have limited it to items whose primary . 
34 Kermit L. Hall, "Law Librarians and the New American Legal History " L~w Library J<?urnal 81 (1989): 1; Jamil S. Zainaldin, "The New Leg~l 
History: A Revxew Essay," Nonhwestern University Law Review 73 (1978): 
205. The dean of the school of law and society is J. Willard Hurst. 
35 The so-called "antiquarian" approach to law furnishes the building blocks 
for many future researchers, and it is less likely to be motivated and tainted by 
the author's preconceptions and political purposes. 
' 
36 For an example of the importance of understanding the "nuts and bolts" 
ofleg~l records, not~J!aroldB. Gill, Jr., and George M. Curtis ill, "Virginia's 
Coloma! Probate Pohc1es and the Preconditions for Economic History " VMHB 
87 (1979): 68-73. ' 
I 
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focus is the law itself, and I have not included items whose 
primary focus is the influence of the law. 37 
The history of the basic legal principles of tort, contract, 
and property law in the seventeenth and ei~hteenth centuries has 
not yet been investigated and described. There has been a 
beginning to the history of criminal law and of law courts in 
Virginia. Family law, property law, and commercial law are 
relevant to social and economic history, but as far as Virginia 
history is concerned, these subjects have been neglected. 
IV 
The truly important question is why should one study the 
legal history of Virginia - that is, Virginia as opposed to 
America, not as opposed to North Carolina or Maryland. Aside 
from the federal law of the United States, there was little or no 
American law before the twentieth century and the successes of a 
few items of "uniform" legislation, most notably the Uniform 
Commercial Code. For the nineteenth century and earlier, the 
notion of American law is only an academic generalization. Actual 
law that is binding and in force is the law of the individual and 
specific state plus federal law. The statement of the law of a 
single state has a validity that the generalization of American legal 
ideas necessarily lacks. This is not to discourage the study of 
general American law but rather to encourage the investigation of 
state-specific law on which the general American law studies must 
ultimately be based. 
The difficulty of state-oriented legal history is caused by 
academic politics. An expert in the history of a single state is at 
a distinct disadvantage in getting employment at a university in 
another state. Moreover, a scholar who specializes in the history 
of his or her own state is often belittled as parochial. Further-
more, there is the serious problem of sectional jealousies, and 
stereotypical thinking rather than evidence informs too much 
37 This distinction is easy to state but difficult to apply. 
38 Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror (New York, 1989) p. vii: "The 
technical history of substantive law . . . remains to be done, and surely we 
would know a good deal more about American legal culture if we bad a better 
understanding of the law's technical [workings]." Nelson and Reid, Literature 
of American Legal History, p. 257: "The first task of historians is to accumulate 
factual data from the past." 
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writing that attempts to pass as scholarship.39 Until these problems 
can be solved, American legal history will continue to be retarded. 
In spite of these problems, the significance of Virginia in 
American legal history needs to be considered. Before 1800 
Virginia was the largest, wealthiest, and most populous colony and 
state. Virginia was one of the more politically significant states up 
to 1861. The legal culture of Virginia produced dominant national 
figures such as Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and Ja.rtfes 
Monroe. The first two United States attorneys general, Edmund 
Randolph (1790-1794) and Charles Lee (1795-1801), were 
Virginians, as were Supreme Court justices John. Blair, Jr. 
(1789-1796), Bushrod Washington (1798-1829), Philip Pendleton 
Barbour (1836-1841), and Peter Vivian Daniel (1841-1860). One 
could also mention George Wythe, Edmund Pendleton, Peyton 
Randolph, St. George Tucker, William Wirt, John Tyler, Abel 
Parker Upshur, and Conway Robinson, who were trained to the 
Virginia bar, and George Washington, James Madison, and 
G~~g~ Ma~on, who were not but who served actively in the 
yrrgmm legislature. All of these persons were significant figures 
m the development of American law as well as Virginia legal 
history. To ignore Virginia legal history is to miss a significant 
aspect of the development of American legal history at the 
inception of the United States. 
Works of general American legal history and general 
American law can be found through the following excellent 
bibliographical works: Kermit L. Hall, A Comprehensive Biblio-
graphy of American Constitutional and Legal History, 1896-1979 
(1984, 1991); William E. Nelson and John Phillip Reid, The 
Literature of American Legal History (1985); and Leonard A. 
Jones, An Index to Legal Periodical Literature (1888, 1899). 
v 
It is axiomatic that sound history must be based on primary 
source material~ .. The popular. histor!an's imagination is usually 
found to be politically and socially bmsed by the next generation 
of scholars. An intimate familiarity with the court records 
reports, and statutes is a precondition to successful legal history: 
In spite of significant losses of Virginia legal records over the 
39 An example is noted by Paul D. Carrington, "The Revolutionary Idea of 
University Legal Education," W!n. & Mary Law Rev. 31 (1990): 573-74. 
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centuries, much legal source material remains and awaits attention. 
As one would expect, the statutes are the most easily found. 
Thanks to William Waller Hening, the colonial statutes were 
printed before the loss of the manuscript copies. 40 Equal credit for 
the publication of the old Virginia acts is due to Thomas Jeffer-
son, first for having collected and preserved the manuscripts and 
second for having supplied the political influence to accomplish 
their printing at the public expense. (Much gratitude is owed also 
to the Jamestown Foundation, which has reprinted these thirteen 
volumes on good paper.) Recently discovered colonial Virginia 
statutes have also been published. 41 The Virginia Acts of Assembly 
have been printed immediately following each session of the 
General Assembly since 1732. 
All of the known reports of Virginia case law have been 
published, with the exception of St. George Tucker's reports, 
which are currently being prepared for the press by Charles T. 
Cullen. It is especially to be regretted that manuscript reports of 
cases compiled by William Hopkins (d. 1734), John Randolph (d. 
1784), John Brown (d. 1810), and John Marshall (d. 1835) have 
been lost before being published. 42 
Many original Virginia records have survived from the 
courts. 43 This material was more carefully preserved than other 
records because it is the legal foundation of property titles and 
rights. Most of the order books from the older periods have been 
microfllmed, but the loose papers have not been. Even though 
microfllm copies of the older court order books are generally 
available, the importance of having scholarly printed editions of 
40 William Waller Hening, comp., The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection 
of All the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 
1619 13 vols., (Richmond and other cities, 1809-23). 
~41 Waverly K. Winfree, comp., The Laws of Virginia: Being a Supplement 
to Hening's The Statutes at Large, 1700-1750 (Richmond, 1971); Warren M. 
Billings, ed., "Some Acts Not in Hening's Statutes: The Acts of Assembly, 
April1652, November 1652, and July 1653," VMHB 83 (1975): 22-76. 
42 W. Hamilton Bryson, "Virginia Manuscript Law Reports," Law Library 
Journal 82 (1990): 305-11. 
43 W. H. Bryson, "Law Reporting and Legal Records in Virginia, 
1607-1800," in John H. Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports, and the 
Growth of Case Law (Berlin, 1989), pp. 319-35. 
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order books cannot be overestimated. The following are the only 
ones available to date. 
Susie M. Ames, ed. County Court Records of Accomack-North-
. ampton, Virginia, 1632-1640 (Washington, D.C., 1954) . 
Suste M. Ames, ed. County Court Records of Accomack-North-
ampton, Virginia, 1640-1645, Virginia Historical Socie~ 
Documents, 10 (Charlottesville, 1973). ' 
Boyd Crumrine, ed. Virginia Court Records in Southwestern 
Pen_nsylvania: Records of the District of West Augusta and 
Ohw and Yohogania Counties, Virginia, 1775-1780 
(Baltimore, 1974; reprint Baltimore, 1981). 
Peter Charles Hoffer and William B. Scott, eds. Criminal 
Proceedings in Colonial Virginia: [Records of] Fines, 
Examinations of Criminals, Trials of Slaves, etc., from 
March.1710 [1711] to [1754] [Richmond County, Virginia] 
(Washington, D.C., 1984). 
"Lower Norfolk County Records, 1636-1646," Virginia Magazine 
of History and Biography, 39 (1931): 1-20, 118-25, 
239-49; 40 (1932): 35-43, 133-46, 236-40, 355-61; 41 
(1933): 50-58, 117-22, 244-50, 335-45. 
Mary Rawlings, ed. "Albemarle County Court, Order Book 
1744/45," Papers of the Albemarle County Historical 
Society, 5 (1945): 7-35. [This is a transcription of pages 
1-10 of the Order Book followed by some miscellaneous 
extracts.] 
Marshall Wingfield, ed. An Old Virginia Court: Being a Tran-
scrip.t f}f the Records of the First Court of Franklin County, 
Virg1ma, 1786-1789 (Memphis, Tenn., 1948). 
It is a pity that the Virginia legal records have not been as 
carefully searched by legal historians as they have been by 
genealogists. And we can regret that the genealogists' numerous 
printed extracts omit the legal details that are, of course useless 
to family history but are crucial to legal history. 44 The c~ntinued 
publishing of Virginia legal records must be encouraged and 
su~p<?rted; the high q~ality of _legal history depends on it. The 
validtty of secondary histoncalliterature depends on the accessibil-
ity of the primary sources. 
44 It is for this reason that the published extracts of legal records are not 
included in this bibliography. 
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Conclusion 
If American legal history is to be sound scholarship, it must 
take Virginia legal history into account. However, Virginia legal 
history has been largely neglected. Only a small amount of court 
record material from the colonial period has been printed. Much 
more needs to be done before seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
legal history can be properly written. Although primary sources 
in the form of statutes and reports from the period following 
Independence are in pririt and available, they have not been 
worked into analytical descriptions of the development of the 
fundamental principles of law: property, contracts, torts, crime, 
family law, and so forth. Until the law is well known, the 
relationships of law and society will remain imperfectly under-
stood. 
This bibliography amply demonstrates the sparseness of 
Virginia legal history. Very few of the entries were written in 
order to chronicle the legal past. What is presented here is printed 
secondary data from which the legal history of Virginia can be 
written. This lack of historical writing on the subject is unfortu-
nate, especially because, in my opinion, the law is more the 
products of past experience, history, than of abstract logic. To 
understand the modem law, we need to appreciate its antecedents. 
The purpose of this bibliography, then, is to facilitate the writing 
of legal history. Perhaps it should have been entitled "A Bibliog-
raphy for Legal Historians." 
Many of the entries refer to articles and books that were 
written before 1900 and were never intended to be historical 
treatments of their subjects but rather to be commentaries on the 
contemporary law. These are, of course, historical sources for the 
modem writer. The other major type of entry is biographical 
sketches, usually obituaries, of judges and lawyers. Obituaries in 
. newspapers have not been included. The periodical sources have 
9een searched through the last 1995 issues. 
The legal historian lives with two problems that defy 
satisfactory solution. These are, of course, "How far does the law 
extend?" and "When does history stop?" The law touches all 
aspects of human existence, but some practical limits must be 
found for this bibliography. Therefore, I have taken the more 
traditional and restricted view and have limited the scope to the 
common and statute law, its administration by the bench and the 
bar, and its study by teachers and their students. As to the second 
problem, it may be that the present is but a moment between the 
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past and the future. This solution, however, places too great a 
burden on the conscientious historian. Therefore, I have arbitrarily 
drawn the line at 1900. This date gives us almost three hundred 
years to deal with. Finally, I have omitted material dealing with 
federal law and with lawyers who were primarily politicians, such 
as Thomas Jefferson, or primarily national figures, such as John 
Marshall, except for a few items that deal directly with Vir_gi_Wa 
law and practice. · ' 
The compiling of this bibliography has extended over many 
years, and on some days, I was in a more expansive frame of 
mind than on others. Therefore, if any entry might appear to be 
outside of the stated scope of this work, the reader may consider 
it to be the thirteenth roll of the baker's dozen. 
